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BE HONEST WITH ME: HOW FEDERAL
REGULATION OF SPORTS GAMBLING MUST
PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE GAME
Grant Ellfeldt*
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court struck down the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA). Before the Court’s decision,
PASPA had entirely prohibited states from legalizing sports gambling. In
light of their newfound liberty, states began to individually legalize and regulate sports gambling. The federal government did not wait long to introduce
their own regulations. On December 19, 2018, Congress introduced the
Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act (SWMIA). At its core, SWMIA is
designed to protect the integrity of professional sports.
To protect the integrity of professional sports and prevent fraud,
SWMIA must accomplish three things. First, because sports wagers are similar to securities, SWMIA’s regulations should mirror securities regulations.
Specifically, the bill should establish a federal agency to enforce criminal
punishments for fraud. While SWMIA establishes the National Sports Wagering Clearinghouse (“Clearinghouse”) to collect and distribute information, Congress should extend the powers of the Clearinghouse to investigate and enforce criminal punishments against fraud.
Second, SWMIA must properly balance the roles of federal and state
governments. Through a form of cooperative federalism, SWMIA appropriately balances state and federal roles. SWMIA establishes the Clearinghouse
to centralize resources in the fight against illegal gambling. At the same
time, by allowing states to individually license their operators, SWMIA preserves local discretion in the states.

* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author would like to thank
Professor Carlos Berdejo for his insight and feedback. The author would also like to thank the staff
members and editors of Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their hard work in
publishing the article. He would specifically like to thank Rozalyn Johnson and Christopher Netniss for going above and beyond their duties to edit the article. Finally, the author would like to
thank his classmates Chaz Shizumura for talking sports every day and Amanda Lee for reminding
him to not take life too seriously.
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Finally, successful regulations must both encourage and require the
professional sports leagues to cooperate with enforcement agencies. To encourage cooperation, SWMIA grants exclusive control of sports gambling
data to the leagues. While the exclusive data provision grants the leagues
immense power, it is necessary to encourage cooperation between the government and the leagues. Merely encouraging the leagues to cooperate, however, is not enough. SWMIA must also require the leagues to cooperate.
Otherwise, as Tim Donaghy’s dramatic scandal illustrates, the leagues have
leeway to conceal pervasive fraud.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 30, 2007, Tim Donaghy teed up a perfectly white golf ball,
driver in hand.1 His phone vibrated inside his pocket.2 He straightened up
and answered the phone.3 His driver fell to the soft grass that surrounded his
beautiful Florida home.4 Two weeks later, Donaghy was sitting in the United
States Attorney’s Office in Brooklyn, New York, divulging shocking information about the largest sports gambling scandal in nearly a century.5
Between 1994 and 2007, Tim Donaghy refereed National Basketball
Association (NBA) games.6 There was nothing suspicious about Donaghy
on the surface, but he had a serious detrimental habit.7 Donaghy was a compulsive gambler.8 In 2003, he allegedly conspired with a small group of
sports bookkeepers to place wagers on games that he officiated.9 The group

1. Scott Eden, How Former Ref Tim Donaghy Conspired to Fix NBA Games, ESPN (Feb.
19, 2019), https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/25980368/how-former-ref-tim-donaghy-conspired-fix-nba-games [https://perma.cc/2RMQ-GAAN].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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started with small bets, but the stakes quickly escalated.10 Donaghy and his
crew allegedly placed large bets on games he officiated, but not large enough
to raise suspicion by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).11 By the
time the FBI began its investigation, Donaghy had dug himself into one of
the biggest scams in sports history.12
During their investigation, the FBI met with high-level NBA executives, including then-Commissioner David Stern.13 Stern promised to fully
comply with the investigation.14 However, just a few days after the meeting,
the story leaked to the press, blowing the investigation wide open.15 As a
result, any chance of catching other referees entangled in the scandal dissipated once the story hit the press.16 Although Donaghy was punished, the
FBI missed out on a golden opportunity to uncover the depth of this gambling scandal.17
Donaghy’s scandal embodies the gambling fraud that threatens the integrity of professional sports. For this very reason, the major professional
sports leagues have historically opposed sports gambling.18 This intense opposition, however, has evolved into mild skepticism and has now bloomed
into open acceptance.19 In the past few years, the leagues, including the
NBA, National Football League (NFL), National Hockey League (NHL),
and Major League Baseball (MLB) have more or less come to approve the
legalization of sports gambling.20
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Robert Shawhan, Legalizing Federal Sports Gambling Laws: You Got to Know When
to Hold’em, 40 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 41, 44–45 (2018).
19. Id.
20. See David Purdum, $12 Billion in Handle? Why Pennsylvania Sports Betting Could be
Huge, ESPN (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/25278065/with-estimated-
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Until May 14, 2018, federal law prohibited sports gambling in every
state with limited exceptions.21 When the Supreme Court struck down the
law prohibiting sports gambling in Murphy v. NCAA, states became free to
legalize and regulate sports gambling.22 Not surprisingly, Congress did not
wait long before drafting regulations designed to maintain competitive integrity and combat fraudulent gambling.23 The federal regulations are currently pending before the House of Representatives.24
To be successful, federal regulation of sports gambling must protect the
integrity of professional sports. Using the regulations pending before the
House as a guideline, successful federal regulations will accomplish three
things. First, since securities and sports gambling regulations are so similar,
sports gambling regulations should emulate securities regulations. Second,
appropriate regulations will maintain a balance between federal and state
power. Finally, successful regulations should encourage and require the
leagues to cooperate with government enforcement agencies. Donaghy’s
scandal emphasizes why the regulations must keep the leagues accountable
for internal violations, and how the current draft alarmingly falls a step short.
This Article first argues that sports wagers are very similar to securities
regulations. Because they are similar, federal regulations of sports gambling
should largely draw from securities regulations. Next, this Article establishes the importance of balancing federal and state power when regulating
sports gambling, and explains how the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act
(SWMIA) properly balances such power. Finally, this Article argues that to
12-million-handle-here-why-pennsylvania-sports-betting-market-dwarf-nevada
[https://perma.cc/Q8MN-SPTA]; see also Anthony Cabot & Keith Miller, Regulatory Models for
Sports Wagering: The Debate Between State vs. Federal Oversight, 8 UNLV GAMING L.J. 153,
177-78 (2018) (explaining how decline in NFL ratings has led first to the proliferation of fantasy
sports and sports gambling); see also Adam Candee, NHL’s Bettman Joins NBA, NFL In Call For
National Sports Betting Rules, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 29, 2018, 11:25 AM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20787/nhl-joins-nba-nfl-in-national-sports-betting-rules/
[https://perma.cc/6KKT-PNS8] [hereinafter NHL’s Bettman Joins NBA & NFL]; see also David
Purdum,
MLB
to
Talk
Betting
with
Owners,
ESPN
(Feb.
5,
2015),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/12286521/mlb-commissioner-rob-manfred-says-legalizedsports-betting-needs-fresh-consideration [https://perma.cc/R276-5FWY] [hereinafter MLB Talk
with Owners].
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2012).
22. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
23. Sports Wagering Market and Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. (2018).
24. Id.
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protect the integrity of professional sports, federal regulations should both
encourage and require the leagues to cooperate with enforcement agencies.
To foster cooperation, SWMIA vests exclusive data rights in the sports
leagues. However, SWMIA falls one step short and must also require the
leagues to cooperate.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Sports Gambling in American History
Traditionally, American culture has given sports gambling a cold reception.25 The widely-publicized integrity violations in historical American
sports have made sports gambling far from a fan favorite.26 For example, the
1919 Chicago White Sox essentially threw away the World Series after becoming involved with gambling operators.27 Pete Rose, baseball’s all-time
leader in hits, still faces exclusion from the Hall of Fame because he placed
wagers on his team as a manager.28 Tim Donaghy has similarly become a
social outcast because he allegedly placed wagers on NBA games that he
refereed.29
Despite these incidents, sports gambling has remained legal in a few
states, including Nevada.30 Over the last forty years, Congress has indirectly
regulated sports gambling by helping individual states impose local regulations.31 However, congressional regulation of sports betting has been limited
in scope. For example, in 1961, Congress enacted the Wire Act.32 This Act

25. See Shawhan, supra note 18, at 44–45.
26. Id. at 45.
27. MLB Talk with Owners, supra note 20.
28. Pete Rose Banned for Life: Giamatti Says He Bet On Games; Appeal Possible in Year,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 24, 1989, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-08-24mn-1531-story.html [https://perma.cc/9LRY-QJ9B].
29. Eden, supra note 1.
30. Shawhan, supra note 18, at 44.
31. E.g. Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 154.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012).
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criminalized certain wire transfers pertaining to gambling.33 In 1978, Congress enacted the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA).34 The IHA ensured that
bookkeepers split profits with track and horse owners.35 While the IHA regulated profits of private operators, it did not regulate profits on a criminal
level.36 The Wire Act and IHA represent the bulk of federal regulation of
sports gambling in the latter twentieth century.37

B. PASPA: Broad Prohibition on Sports Gambling
In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).38 Instead of regulating sports gambling, PASPA only
prohibited state legislatures from legalizing sports gambling.39 PASPA did
not allow states or persons to “sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote . . . a
lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme” based
on professional or amateur sports.40 However, PASPA carved out several
exceptions, including grandfathering Nevada outside the prohibition.41 The
Act also provided a limited exception for New Jersey, which allowed the
state to legalize and license sports gambling in Atlantic City within one year
of PASPA’s enactment.42
Throughout the PASPA era, the professional sports leagues have collectively supported PASPA’s purpose and resisted the legalization of sports
33. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3007 (2012).
35. See id.
36. See Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 155.
37. Id. at 154–55.
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012).
39. Id. § 3702.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 3704(a)(2).
42. Id. § 3704(a)(3); New Jersey never legalized sports gambling in their allotted year, but
they tried hard in later years. See Scott J. Gregory, Don’t Bet on It? Economic and Legal Implications of Legalized Sports Betting and Daily Fantasy Sports in the United States, 10 OHIO ST. BUS.
L.J. 217, 222–27 (2016).
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gambling.43 While the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA)
position has not changed, the NBA, NFL, NHL, and MLB have slowly
shifted from opposing sports gambling to approving of it, starting with fantasy sports.44

C. Fantasy Sports and the Slow Crawl Towards Approval of Sports
Gambling
Fantasy sports function similar to sports gambling.45 Instead of betting
on the outcome of individual games, fantasy participants essentially bet on
the outcome of individual players.46 Participants typically pay an entry fee
to join a fantasy league.47 The participants then assemble their team of individual players, usually from a draft pool.48 Each week, the professional players receive points based on their individual performance.49 At the end of the
season, the participant with the most collective points or team victories wins
and receives a prize.50 By choosing players who they believe will perform
well, participants place a bet on the collective performances of real-life players.51

43. See Gregory, supra note 42, at 220 (detailing the bitter battle over legalization of sports
betting between New Jersey’s legislature and the major professional and collegiate sport leagues).
44. See id. at 235–37.
45. See Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports: A Detailed
Primer in Federal and State Gambling Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 129–34 (2016) (outlining
how daily fantasy sports must comply with gambling laws because of their similarities).
46. See How Online Fantasy Sports Work, BETTING USA, https://www.bettingusa.com/fantasy/how-it-works/ [https://perma.cc/2UU7-B88P]; see also Edelman, supra note 45,
at 129–34; see also Andrew Brandt, The NFL has a Gambling Problem, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.si.com/mmqb/2015/11/05/nfl-gambling-daily-fantasy-dfs-draftkingsfanduel-goodell [https://perma.cc/98U9-4FJN].
47. How Online Fantasy Sports Work, supra note 46.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Edelman, supra note 45, at 129–34; see also Brandt, supra note 46.
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Fantasy sports have paved the way for the legalization of sports gambling.52 In the last decade, both the NBA and NFL reached substantial sponsorship deals with major fantasy companies like FanDuel and DrafKings.53
The NBA has even taken an equity stake in FanDuel.54 The change in position by the sports leagues is largely motivated by the need to restore fan engagement.55 For example, ratings for NBA and NFL games—the two most
popular sports in the United States—has declined in recent years.56 As a
result of the decline, the leagues are looking for new ways to restore fan
engagement.57 Fantasy sports keep fans engaged in ways that traditional
sports do not.58 For example, even when the outcome of a game is largely
determined by the score, fantasy participants will continue watching to see
how their player performs.59 The increasing popularity of fantasy sports has
played a large role in the acceptance of sports gambling.

D. The Long Battle Between New Jersey and the Leagues
As fantasy sports paved the way for sports gambling, New Jersey set
out to re-vamp its gambling economy.60 During World War II, long before
the passage of PASPA, the gambling economy in New Jersey’s Atlantic City

52. See Edelman, supra note 45, at 129.
53. Dustin Gouker, DFS Partnership / Sponsorship Tracker, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Nov.
13, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/dfs-sponsorship-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/6TP3882T].
54. Darren Heitner, FanDuel Signs Multi-Year Partnerships With 13 NBA Teams, FORBES
(June 23, 2015, 8:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2015/06/23/fanduel-signsmulti-year-partnerships-with-13-nba-teams/#6653277bbf25 [https://perma.cc/ML6B-Q7Q6].
55. See Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 161-62.
56. Scooby Axson, NFL TV Ratings Down 7.5 Percent, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 18,
2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/10/18/nfl-television-ratings-decline [https://perma.cc/U9K82WUW]; see Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 161–62.
57. Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 162.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Gregory, supra note 42, at 223.
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slumped.61 After a legislative push that increased tourism by stimulating
casino markets, the city’s economy steadily grew.62 Despite this past growth,
in recent years, Atlantic City’s gambling economy has reached yet another
slump.63 In 2014, four casinos shut down completely.64 In order to revitalize
its gambling industry, Atlantic City needed to differentiate its gambling experience. By the time New Jersey committed itself to revitalizing its casinos,
PASPA obstructed the state’s policy.65 Although PASPA allowed New Jersey to legalize sports gambling in Atlantic City within one year of PASPA’s
enactment,66 New Jersey did not legalize sports gambling within their allotted year.67
In 2011, by referendum, New Jersey voters repealed the state ban on
sports gambling.68 After the voters repealed the ban, the New Jersey legislature quickly enacted a law authorizing and regulating sports gambling at
casinos and racetracks.69 New Jersey realized that their law conflicted with
PASPA, so they made efforts to reconcile the conflict.70 For example, a New
Jersey Congressman proposed a federal bill that would exempt New Jersey
from PASPA.71 They also proposed a bill that would give all states four

61. Id.
62. Id. at 224.
63. Id. at 225.
64. Wayne Parry, Associated Press, As 4 of its 12 Casinos Closed, Atlantic City Casino
Industry Grew Operating Profit 44 Percent, FOX BUSINESS (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/as-4-of-its-12-casinos-closed-atlantic-city-casino-industry-grew-operatingprofit-44-percent [https://perma.cc/PXE6-2MVU].
65. Gregory, supra note 42, at 227.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3) (2012).
67. Gregory, supra note 42, at 222.
68. NJ Voters: We Want to Bet on Sports if US Says Yes, NBC (Nov. 8, 2011, 10:44 PM),
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/NJ-Sports-Betting-Votes-Yes-Federal-Ban-Lifted133506083.html [https://perma.cc/X36U-2KCG].
69. NCAA v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (D. N.J. 2014).
70. Gregory, supra note 42, at 226–27.
71. N.J. Betting and Equal Treatment Act of 2012, H.R. 3809, 112th Cong. (2012).
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years to legalize sports gambling.72 Neither of the bills, however, survived
House committee debates.73
In 2012, the same year that New Jersey amended their Constitution to
allow sports gambling, the four major sports leagues and the NCAA brought
an action in federal court to enjoin the amendment.74 The leagues argued
that the amendment clearly violated PASPA.75 In response, New Jersey
argued that PASPA violated the Tenth Amendment because it
commandeered state authority.76 However, the Third Circuit Court held that
PASPA did not violate the Tenth Amendment.77 The court framed the issue
in terms of federal power and state power under the Supremacy Clause.78 In
terms of the anti-commandeering principle, the court distinguished between
requiring and prohibiting the states from doing something.79 It reasoned,
“[w]hen Congress passes a law that operates via the Supremacy Clause to
invalidate contrary state laws, it is not telling the states what to do; it is
barring them from doing something they want to do.”80 Unlike prior cases
of federal coercion, the court continued, “PASPA does not require or coerce
the states to lift a finger.”81 Based on this distinction, the court held that
PASPA did not violate the Tenth Amendment and thus, PASPA prevented
New Jersey from repealing its ban and legalizing sports gambling.82 The

72. Sports Gaming Opportunity Act of 2012, H.R. 3797, 112th Cong. (2012).
73. See id. (did not pass House of Representatives); see also H.R. 3809 (did not pass House
of Representatives).
74. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir. 2013).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 224.
77. Id. at 237.
78. Id. at 230.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 231 (emphasis in original).
82. Id. at 237.
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court’s decision received due criticism.83 Experts and scholars alike took
issue with the amount of unregulated, illegal sports gambling that occurred
daily and they criticized the court’s apparent willingness to overlook the
unregulated market.84 Although the Supreme Court denied New Jersey’s
writ of certiorari,85 New Jersey’s persistence and legal arguments would soon
win the day.

E. Prohibited No More: New Jersey Finally Wins and Changes the
Landscape of Sports Gambling
After the Third Circuit upheld PASPA in 2013, New Jersey enacted a
subsequent law specifically drafted to circumvent PASPA.86 The legislature
specifically framed the law as a repeal rather than an authorization of sports
gambling.87 As expected, the leagues once again brought suit to invalidate
the law.88 Consistent with the Third Circuit’s ruling in 2013, the District
Court and Third Circuit found that PASPA did not violate the anti-commandeering rule because it “does not command states to take affirmative actions.”89
However, unlike the 2013 case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Murphy v. NCAA.90 The issue of the case boiled down to whether repealing a law that prohibits sports gambling is equivalent to “authorizing” sports
gambling.91 In its decision, the Court explained the history of the anti-commandeering principle, starting with the ratification of the Constitution.92 The
83. See Gregory, supra note 42, at 235–40.
84. See id.
85. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1472 (2018).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1473 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208,
401 (3d Cir. 2013)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1473–75.
92. Id. at 1475.
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Court emphasized that the anti-commandeering principle “is important” because it is a “structural protection[] of liberty,” it “promotes political accountability,” and it “prevents Congress from shifting the cost of regulations
to the states.”93 After setting the stage of precedent and policy, the Supreme
Court held that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering rule because it “unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do.”94 Regardless of the interpretation of “authorize,” the Court found that through
PASPA, “state legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress.”95
When considering the anti-commandeering principle, the Supreme
Court rejected the distinction between prohibiting and requiring the states to
act.96 According to the Court, the basic anti-commandeering rule boils down
to: “Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures.”97 As far as the
Court was concerned, this basic rule applies regardless if the law prohibits
or requires the states to act.98 The Court also affirmatively refused to frame
the issue in terms of federal supremacy.99 It held that the Supremacy Clause
does not confer independent legislative power.100 Rather, it is simply a “rule
of decision” when deciding conflicts between federal and state law.101 Since
the Constitution grants the federal government power to regulate private actors, the Supremacy Clause is essentially a tiebreaking mechanism between
federal and state regulations.102 PASPA’s provision preventing states from

93. Id. at 1477.
94. Id. at 1478.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1479.
100. Id. (citations omitted).
101. Id. (citations omitted).
102. Id.
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legalizing sports gambling, however, did not regulate or restrict private actors.103 Therefore, PASPA could not be classified as a federal regulation and
the Supremacy Clause did not apply.104 After New Jersey’s long and bitter
fight, the Supreme Court finally struck down PASPA.105

F. Enter Federal Government: Schumer and Hatch Draft Federal
Regulations of Sports Gambling
Many states did not wait long after Murphy struck down PASPA to
legalize and regulate sports gambling. Since Murphy, eleven states, including New Jersey, have proposed and passed legislation legalizing sports gambling.106 New Jersey collected $94 million in sports gambling revenue in the
second half of 2018, but this number is relatively small compared to the
$2.51 billion in racetrack and casino revenue.107 More states are expected to
pass similar legislation as they take advantage of tax benefits and explore
new methods to revitalize local economies.108

103. Id. at 1481.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1485.
106. Alexandra Licata, 42 States Have or are Moving Towards Legalizing Sports Betting –
Here are the States Where Sports Betting is Legal, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 2, 2019, 1:51 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/states-where-sports-betting-legal-usa-2019-7
[https://perma.cc/U73A-ALHK].
107. Joyce Hanson, NJ Sees $1.25B Wagered in Legal Sports Betting in 2018, LAW 360
(Jan. 15, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1118464/nj-sees-1-25b-wagered-in-legal-sports-betting-in-2018 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
108. Illegal influence of sports matches is a substantial part of the illegal gambling market.
Illegal influence usually consists of a group of operators and high-stake gamblers working with
corrupt professional sports insiders who unduly influence the outcome of games under their control.
This Note is most concerned with this kind of illegal influence, but there are many forms of illegal
gambling. Money laundering is also an illegal practice closely related to sports gambling. See Best
Practices for Anti-Money Laundering Compliance, AM. GAMING ASS’N (2017), https://www.americangaming.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Best-Practice-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WWF772GL].
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Predictably, the federal government quickly got involved. In December 2018, senators Chuck Schumer and Orrin Hatch proposed the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act (SWMIA).109 SWMIA establishes comprehensive federal regulations of sports gambling.110 The Act primarily “set[s]
standards for sports wagering and provide[s] law enforcement with additional authority to target the illegal sports wagering market.”111 The Bill will
likely not pass in 2019, but it may pass eventually.112 The bipartisan nature
of SWMIA and the strong support from professional sports leagues113 suggests that the Act ultimately has a strong chance of passing.

III. DISCUSSION
The successful regulation of sports gambling is a daunting task. To
successfully regulate sports gambling, maintaining the integrity of professional sports is crucial. There are many ways to approach the integrity issues
that lie outside the scope of this Article, but successful regulations should
focus on three things. First, because of their inherent similarities, sports
gambling regulations should mirror securities regulations. Specifically, the
regulations should develop an enforcement agency that imposes criminal
punishments for fraud. SWMIA establishes a national agency to help combat illegal gambling, but this agency lacks the ability to criminally enforce
fraudulent activities.
Second, sports gambling regulations must strike a proper balance between federal and state control. The states have a significant local interest
in licensing operators within their borders. At the same time, the federal
government has a significant national interest in combatting illegal gam-

109. See generally Sports Wagering Market and Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. (2018).
110. See generally id.
111. Id. § 2(10) (Findings).
112. Adam Candee, Hatch, Schumer Preparing to Drop Federal Sports Betting Bill in Senate, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Dec. 19, 2018, 9:51 AM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/26901/federal-sports-betting-bill-drop/ [https://perma.cc/PZ65-QTP6] [hereinafter Sports Bill in Senate].
113. In contrast to the NBA, NFL, MLB and NHL, the NCAA continues to strongly oppose
the legalization of sports gambling. See Candee, supra note 20; see also Dustin Gouker, NCAA
Head: Sports Betting Is ‘Going to Threaten the Integrity of College Sports In Many Ways’, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/28038/ncaa-says-sports-bettingwill-threaten-integrity/ [https://perma.cc/N4EZ-DTNC].
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bling. SWMIA effectively balances both interests. By adopting a cooperative federalism approach, SWMIA leaves states with discretion in choosing
who they license with. Likewise, the Act establishes a national entity to collect and distribute data to enforcement agencies. SWMIA’s successful balancing of both federal and state interests will contribute to the success of the
regulations.
Finally, successful regulations must both encourage and require sports
leagues to cooperate with one another. The federal government cannot effectively combat fraud without their support. To foster encouragement, the
regulations should compensate the leagues for use of their data. While compensation for use of sports data is not supported in existing law, SWMIA
creates an exception by granting the leagues exclusive control over data used
by sports gamblers. This data provision grants immense power to the
leagues, but it is necessary to encourage cooperation between the leagues
and government. Donaghy’s scandal, however, illustrates how the leagues
still might undermine enforcement agencies to preserve their brand. The
regulations, therefore, must also require the leagues to cooperate with enforcement agencies.

A. Successful Sports Gambling Regulations Should Emulate Federal
Securities Regulations
“[T]here is no moral difference between gambling . . . on the race track
and gambling in the stock market.”114 In his quote before Congress, Theodore Roosevelt wryly articulates that gambling and investing share many
similarities. The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 regulate the registration
and exchange of securities between investors.115 Mr. Roosevelt’s opinion
suggests that because of their similarities, federal sports gambling regulations should emulate security regulations for two reasons. First, investment
contracts and sports wagers are substantively similar. Second, trading securities is also similar to placing sports wagers. With these similarities in mind,
Congress should craft sports gambling regulations that criminally punish for
and broadly enforce against sports gambling fraud.

114. 42 CONG. REC. 1346–50 (1908); John Maynard Keynes echoed Roosevelt’s sentiment: “It is usually agreed that casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible and expensive.
And perhaps the same is true of Stock Exchanges.” JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 159 (1936).
115. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–78lll (2019).
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1. Federal Sports Gambling Regulations Should Emulate Security
Regulations Because Investment Contracts Are Similar to Sports
Gambling Wagers
Investment contracts and gambling wagers are similar for four reasons.
First, investment contracts and sports wagers both involve payment, risk, and
reward. Second, the Supreme Court’s three-part test delineated in SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co.,116 for determining what constitutes an investment contract
extends to many sports wagers. Third, many specific types of security investments are functionally similar to sports gambling wagers. Finally, the
entertainment value in sports gambling does not detract from its similarity to
investment contracts.

a. Investment Contracts and Sports Wagers Both Involve Payment,
Risk, and Reward
Investment contracts and sports wagers both involve payment, risk, and
reward. Common law defines gambling as the payment of “consideration in
order to participate in an activity, that’s [sic] outcome is determined partly
by chance, and may reward the participant with something of value.”117 Like
gambling, investing in stock requires payment to participate.118 The outcome
of the investment is at least partly determined by chance and involves reward
of “something of value.”119 Investing in futures and corporate bonds, for
example, “involve assuming a risk in hopes of an accession to wealth.”120

116. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
117. Christopher B. Chuff, “Rolling the Dice” on Financial Regulatory Reform: Gambling
Law as a Framework for Regulating Structured Investments, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 569,
598 (2011) (citations omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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b. The Howey Test for Securities Includes Many Sports Wagers
Second, the legal test for defining an “investment contract” will include
many sports wagers. Under the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, the definition of “security” includes “investment contracts.”121 In turn, the definition
of “investment contract” has been judicially constructed to include three criteria: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, and (3) with
the expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of the promoter
or a third party.122 Regarding the first requirement, both sports gambling and
securities require an investment of money. Just as the security investor puts
down money in hopes of a future return in a company’s performance, a sports
gambler puts down money in hopes of a future return in a team’s performance.
For the second requirement, both practices involve a common enterprise. Different circuit courts have applied two different standards of “common enterprise.”123 The first is horizontal commonality, which “involves the
pooling of assets from multiple investors so that all share in the profits and
risks of the enterprise.’”124 The second is vertical commonality, which requires that “the investors’ fortunes be interwoven with and dependent upon
the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties.”125
Sports gambling is very similar to vertical commonality. Just as investment
contracts depend on “promoters” and “third parties,”126 sports wagers depend
on promoters and third parties. Sports gamblers rely on sportsbooks to promote sports gambling by accepting and paying out bets. Additionally, sports
gamblers rely on third-party teams and players to achieve the result that the
gambler wagers for. In fact, the results of the wager lie entirely in the hands
of the third-party sports teams.

121. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2019); SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2001).
122. SEC, 265 F.3d at 46.
123. Id. at 49.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citation omitted).
126. See id. (citations omitted).
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For the third Howey requirement, both an investor and a sports gambler
expect profits from their venture.127 Investors hope their recipient company
will perform as the investor anticipates. Similarly, gamblers hope their chosen team will perform as the gambler anticipates. Sports gambling arguably
involves less of an expectation of profit than investment because the risks
attached to sports gambling are higher.128 However, investors looking for
high returns similarly make high-risk security investments.129 The fact that
a sports wager is high-risk does not obviate the fact that the gambler expects
profit.130 If sports gamblers truly did not expect a profit, they would not
place wagers, and sports gambling would not exist. Therefore, because many
sports wagers meet the Howey definition of an “investment contract,” sports
wagers and investment contracts are very similar.

c. Many Specific Types of Investment Contracts Are Similar to
Sports Wagers
Securities are also similar to sports wagers because many specific types
of security investments are similar to sports wagers. For example, a derivative contract is essentially the same as a sports wager.131 A derivative is “a
trading instrument whose value depends on the performance of another variable.”132 Investors usually use derivatives to “hedge against” or “speculate
on” price fluctuations in the market.133 For a long time, derivatives have
been criticized as a “form of legalized gambling.”134 A district court in New
York once found that a certain derivative contract was essentially a gamble,

127. See id. at 46.
128. See Thomas L. Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 375, 409–10 (2005).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 395.
132. Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just “New Financial Bingo”: A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (1997).
133. Id.
134. Hazen, supra note 128, at 395.
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but nevertheless characterized it as a security.135 The court wrote: “Although
I have characterized . . . [the] swap agreements as ‘bets’ and ‘speculations’
on currency fluctuations, the transactions were in the form of forward contracts, swaps and derivatives.”136 Derivatives usually involve high risk and
therefore are similar to sports wagers.137
Futures contracts are also similar to sports wagers. A futures contract
involves exchanging money for a “delivery obligation” at a certain date in
the future.138 “Most futures contracts, are functionally the same as a wager,
since rather than delivering under the contract, the vast majority of futures
contracts are settled through a process known as offset.”139 Generally, instead of “transferring the underlying commodity or security, the parties enter
into offsetting transactions.”140 Therefore, because the parties usually offset
rather than deliver under the contract, the parties essentially place a wager
on the future price of a good.
Finally, hedging closely resembles a sports wager. A hedge fund is
“any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by
professional investment managers, and not widely available to the public.”141
They are typically used to take “both long and short positions on debt and
equity securities to reduce risk.”142 Like hedging, sports wagering can be

135. Korea Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 269 F. Supp. 2d 424, 442
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
136. Id.
137. Krawiec, supra note 132, at 7 (“[D]erivatives are generally perceived as very risky
products.”).
138. Hazen, supra note 128, at 406–07.
139. Id. at 407.
140. Id.
141. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 876.
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used to minimize risk. For example, a team owner can offset losses attributable to low attendance in two ways.143 The owner could hedge for low attendance on the stock market.144 Alternatively, the owner could make a bet
against his or her own team as a functional hedge against revenue loss.145
Both actions are protective measures in anticipation of revenue loss, yet traditional hedging is legal while gambling on one’s own team is not.146 To be
clear, this Article does not advocate that owners should be allowed to bet on
their own teams. There are a host of moral issues associated with this kind
of gambling.147 Nevertheless, hedging and gambling are functionally similar. This similarity should encourage Congress to mirror sports gambling
regulations on securities regulations.

d. Entertainment Value in Sports Gambling Does Not Make It Less
Like a Security
Finally, the entertainment value in sports gambling does not detract
from its similarity to an investment contract. Sports gambling has inherent
entertainment value.148 Most consumers who occasionally place bets would
classify sports wagering as recreational rather than professional.149 The entertainment value of a sports wager, however, does not make it less similar
to an investment contract. Courts have found that a stock exchange structured like a virtual video game was still an investment contract for purposes
of securities laws.150 The court carefully distinguished between substance
and nomenclature.151 When addressing the entertainment element of the exchange, the court gave little weight to the fact that the exchange was called
143. Hazen, supra note 128, at 434–35.
144. Id. at 435.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 377–78.
147. E.g., id. at 379 (hedging against terrorist attacks creates moral issues).
148. Id. at 409 n.147.
149. Id.
150. SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2001).
151. See id. at 47–48.
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and structured like a game.152 The court explained that “it is equally immaterial whether the promoter depicts the enterprise as a serious commercial
venture or dubs it a game.”153 Therefore, though labeled as “games,” sports
wagers are still substantively similar to investment contracts.
Furthermore, like sports gambling, investing in securities often involves some form of entertainment or “thrill.”154 As one scholar has noted:
[I]nvesting in individual securities or derivative products provides
a form of entertainment for some investors in much the same way
as rational actors are willing to gamble, notwithstanding the odds
and the cut to the house, because of the enjoyment of the game.155
Both investing and gambling even satisfy the “need to play because of
the excitement, risk, and rewards investing and gambling both provide.”156
Therefore, labeling should not distract Congress from the substance of the
transactions. Indeed, sports wagers and investment contracts are similar for
many reasons. They both involve the core elements of payment, risk, and
reward. Many sports wagers would furthermore qualify as investment contracts under Howey’s established test, and many particular types of investment contracts closely resemble sports wagers. For each reason described,
and because both investment contracts and securities have some entertainment value, the regulation of sports gambling should resemble the regulation
of securities.

2. Federal Sports Gambling Regulations Should Emulate Security
Regulations Because Trading Securities is Similar to Making a
Sports Wager
In addition to substantive similarities, the economics and behavior involved in trading securities are similar to placing sports wagers. First, trading a security is economically similar to placing a sports wager because both

152. Id. at 52–53.
153. Id. at 48.
154. Hazen, supra note 128, at 401.
155. Chuff, supra note 117, at 607.
156. Id. at 601–02.
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are intended to “reap economic benefits” and both involve “risk taking.”157
In fact, “[m]any gambling activities involve the same kind of analytical ability, research, and skill that informed investing requires.”158 For example,
analyzing how many games the Los Angeles Rams will win in a season requires extensive research of player statistics, matchups, prior records, power
indexes, and many other factors.159 The bettor then analyzes the data and
forms logical predictions about how many wins the Rams will acquire next
season.160 Much of the same “research” and “analytical ability” is required
in investing.161
Additionally, sports gamblers and investors share many behavioral
similarities. First, both practices include overconfidence bias.162 Gamblers
often approach their wager with a false sense of confidence, and they often
attribute their losses to being “unlucky.”163 Similarly, investors “are reluctant to believe that the[] risks apply to them personally.”164 Both gamblers
and investors often approach the wager or investment with a false sense of
confidence that impairs their judgment.
Sports gamblers and investors also exhibit confirmation bias.165 When
they collect information, both gamblers and investors “seek out information
that confirms their beliefs about uncertainties” and “discard information contrary to their beliefs.”166 Both also tend to believe that their information and

157. Hazen, supra note 128, at 377.
158. Chuff, supra note 117, at 599–600.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 609.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 610.
166. Id.
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analytical ability are better than that of the general public, and thus are more
likely to commit to information that supports their initial position.167
Although they generally believe their analytical ability is above-average, sports gamblers and investors also tend to participate in herd behavior.168 In other words, when trading securities or placing wagers, both parties
have a “tendency to invest or bet with the crowd or herd.”169 Sports gamblers
often track the ways the sportsbooks adjust the lines, and they have a “fear
of acting contrary to the majority” based on the belief that the majority
knows something important.170 Similarly, investors track the way stock
prices fluctuate and often make decisions in-line with majority investors because they too fear the majority has seized important information.171
Finally, like investing, sports gambling is not necessarily irrational behavior, but could instead be understood as a rational, high-risk investment.172
When an individual on Wall Street wants a high pay-off with “sufficient intensity,” the individual makes a high-risk investment.173 A sports wager is
functionally the same as a high-risk investment in the stock market.174 The
gambler knows that the venture is high-risk, but based on careful research
and analysis, the gambler makes a high-risk, high pay-off investment on the
selected team. Furthermore, even assuming sports gambling contains irrational behavior such as herd behavior and “thrill” seeking, these elements are
also found in investing.175
Therefore, sports wagers and investment contracts are very similar, and
placing a sports wager is closely related to trading securities. Because of
their similarities, federal regulation of sports gambling should largely mirror

167. Id.
168. Id. at 611.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Hazen, supra note 128, at 409–10.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
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the regulation of securities. In particular, sports gambling regulations must
criminally punish and enforce against fraud.

3. Sports Gambling Regulations Should Strictly Punish and Broadly
Enforce Against Fraud
As Congress debates and revises SWMIA, they must ensure that the
substance of sports gambling dictates how it is regulated.176 Social distaste
and a misplaced focus on the parties are distractions that threaten the passage
of effective, substantive-based regulations.177 Like securities, the core attribute of any successful regulation is that it must work to prevent fraud.
Fraud is the core evil of both securities and sports gambling. The Securities
Act was passed in large part “to insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets in transactions.”178 The Exchange Act similarly “provides remedies
to investors or shareholders who have been misled or defrauded.”179 Like
securities, sports gambling is susceptible to fraud.180 As explained below,
Donaghy’s NBA scandal exemplifies how bookies and inside officials can
destroy the integrity of sports.181 Successful sports gambling regulations will
prevent fraud by strictly policing insider behavior and ensuring that professional leagues comply with enforcement agencies.
Like securities, successful regulations should also establish a federal
enforcement agency to enforce against fraud. The Security Acts allows the
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) to directly bring claims against
176. Id. at 377–78.
177. Id. at 377.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2019); Chuff, supra note 117, at 620 (“The Securities Act was enacted to prevent investors from being defrauded in connection with the sale or purchase of securities
in interstate commerce.”).
179. Chuff, supra note 117, at 624; see § 78jjj (creating causes of action based on “fraud
or deceit” and “misrepresentation.”).
180. E.g. Eden supra note 1 (NBA referee placing bets on games he controlled); e.g.,
Gerard Couzens, The Shame in Spain Valencia Caught up in La Liga Match-Fixing Scandal With
Win Over Real Valladolid That Secured Champions League Investigated, THE SUN (May 28, 2019),
https://thesun.co.uk/sport/football/9168154/valencia-la-liga-match-fixing-real-valladolid/
[https://perma.cc/9GRT-SNRW] (La Liga players colluding with bookies to fix matches); e.g.,
Luke Harding, Two Years in Jail for Match-Fixing German Referee, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2005),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2005/nov/18/newsstory.sport4
[https://perma.cc/XPV2X6R2] (German soccer referee colluding with bookies to fix matches).
181. See Eden, supra note 1.
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infringers. The SEC may bring claims against corporations or individuals
“if any of these entities defrauded an investor or shareholder.”182 The most
common claims are securities fraud and insider trading.183 The SEC’s enforcement power is a key model for sports gambling. Just like the SEC,
enforcement of sports gambling needs a national federal agency to pool together resources and personnel to prevent sports gambling fraud on a national level. The individual states cannot hope to individually combat the
bookie and league-insider fraud that permeates state lines.184 Additionally,
a direct enforcement power is important because like individual security
holders, individual sports gamblers will rarely have the resources or incentives to personally go after fraudulent operators. Therefore, maintaining the
integrity of sports gambling requires a national entity that can investigate and
bring claims against fraudulent operators “through enforcement actions.”185
SWMIA establishes a national entity, but the entity lacks power to enforce against fraud. Created by SWMIA, the National Sports Wagering
Clearinghouse (“Clearinghouse”)186 is a national agency that collects and
distributes data on legal and illegal sports gambling.187 With this pooled
data, the Clearinghouse facilitates communication between federal and state
enforcement agencies.188 The collection of information and facilitation of
communication between entities is extremely important, but the Clearinghouse must go one step further. To successfully regulate sports gambling,
the Clearinghouse must also have the power to enforce the regulations
against parties engaged in fraudulent behavior. Armed with enforcement
power, the Clearinghouse could streamline all its resources to efficiently
combat fraudulent gambling in ways that individual consumers could not.
Additionally, as with securities, sports gambling regulations must enforce strict criminal penalties. Strict criminal punishment is a cornerstone of
182. See Chuff, supra note 117, at 624–25 (unlawful to defraud investors); see also § 78jjj
(creating causes of action based on “fraud or deceit” or “misrepresentation”).
183. Chuff, supra note 117, at 624–25.
184. Cabot & Miller supra note 20, at 172.
185. Chuff, supra note 117, at 625.
186. Sports Wagering Market and Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 106(a) (2018).
187. Id. § 106(c)(4).
188. Id.
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corporate and securities regulations. For example, when Congress passed
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), they “increased criminal penalties as an important part of its reforms.”189 Specifically, CEOs and CFOs of public companies were then required to “personally certify their company’s financial
statement with criminal consequences for false certifications.”190
Federal sports gambling regulations should establish similar penalties.
“The criminal enforcement weapon is especially applicable when we recognize that many market participants are gamblers and many of the securities
fraudsters seem to engage in behavior quite similar to those who profit from
illegal gambling activities.”191 Because “fraudsters” in both securities and
gambling behave similarly, criminal punishments are warranted in both.192
Like public companies, gambling operators and sportsbooks that meet minimum thresholds of revenue and/or number of consumers should be required
to establish strict internal controls over their business operations. As a national enforcement entity, the Clearinghouse should be restructured to enforce criminal punishments against sportsbooks and operators that do not
maintain and monitor sufficient internal controls.193 The exact scope of the
internal controls that should be implemented is beyond this Article’s reach.
However, at a minimum, the controls should require the leagues and operators to establish internal controls designed to prevent undue influence of
games.194
189. Hazen, supra note 128, at 384.
190. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2019).
191. Hazen, supra note 128, at 384.
192. Id.
193. While SOX holds company officers personally liable in certain circumstances, that
exact approach may not be conducive to sports gambling. Holding sportsbook operators personally
liable will inevitably create major barriers of entry. The operators will likely have to purchase
professional liability insurance and will inevitably pass this cost on to consumers. If the prices rise
too high, consumers may be driven back into cheap illegal markets. See Purdum, supra note 20
(expressing concern that 34% tax and $10 million licensing fee in Pennsylvania will drive consumers to the cheaper illegal market); Congress should carefully consider whether holding the operators
personally liable is worth the market costs. Regardless, the regulations should require operators to
establish and monitor internal controls that prevent operators from colluding with corrupt insiders
who can influence the outcome of games, especially referees. See Eden, supra note 1; see also
Harding, supra note 180 (German soccer referee colluding with bookies to fix matches).
194. E.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:69n-17 (2019) (New Jersey regulations as example of
regulatory internal controls).
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Because sports wagers and securities are substantively similar, and because trading securities is similar to making sports wagers, sports gambling
regulations should model securities regulations. The regulations should expand the Clearinghouse from a simple information agency into an enforcement agency that closely monitors sportsbooks and league officials. The
foregoing analysis heavily emphasizes the role of the federal government,
but successful regulations also depend on participating state governments.

B. Successful Regulations Will Strike an Appropriate Balance
Between Federal and State Power
The federal regulations outlined above are substantial. They call for
the federal government to play a significant role in the gambling market by
greatly expanding a federal agency to monitor and enforce against fraud.
Comprehensive federal regulations risk depriving the states of their interest
in regulating their citizens. Successful regulations, therefore, must strike a
proper balance between federal and state control. SWMIA adopts an appropriate balance between federal and state regulatory authority. The Act allows
states to create their own regulatory scheme so long as they opt in to the
general federal scheme.195 This type of law is known as “cooperative federalism.”196 A potential problem with this approach is that different states
could regulate and report data differently. The Clearinghouse, however,
solves this problem by nationally collecting data and assisting enforcement
agencies.197 SWMIA’s approach would solve this problem by maintaining
state discretion while equipping the federal government to combat illegal
gambling.

1. States Should Retain Discretion to Issue Licenses
An appropriate balance between federal and state power is crucial to
successfully regulating sports gambling,198 and SWMIA achieves this proper
balance. SWMIA prohibits any operator from accepting sports wagers unless the state where the operator does business has opted in to SWMIA’s
195. See Sports Wagering Market and Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. §§ 101(a), (b)
(2018).
196. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 269
(1981).
197. S. 3793 § 106(a).
198. Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 174.
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regulatory scheme.199 Under this approach, the states must accept the general
federal regulations, but the states retain authority to license the gambling operators.200 The ability to issue licenses is a “central feature” of a state’s
power over its citizens.201 “States’ discretion to grant licenses to and oversee
the operations of casino owners and employees is a central feature of state
regulatory regimes” and those “powers serve as the state’s primary means of
control over the gaming industry.”202 States have many ways to license on a
local level to meet local needs, including restricting hours of operation, prohibiting sportsbooks from offering certain amenities, and broadly taxing
gambling revenue.203 For example, West Virginia currently imposes a 10%
tax on sports gambling while Pennsylvania imposes a 34% tax.204 Both policy choices represent distinct treatment of sports gambling in two different
states and will have different effects on how sports gambling develops locally. Additionally, many states have distinct economic goals in mind. New
Jersey, for example, structures its licensing requirements around revitalizing
Atlantic City as an important economic hub.205 Furthermore, because individual states are closer to the fraud that occurs within their borders, they can
personalize their licensing to prevent local fraud. By allowing states to issue
licenses after opting in to the federal scheme, SWMIA suitably leaves the
states discretion to license their own local operators.206
199. S. 3793 §§ 101(a), (b).
200. S. 3793 §§ 101(b), 103(b)(2)(C).
201. Chuff, supra note 117, at 614.
202. Id.
203. Chuff, supra note 117, at 616 (2011) (an argument can be made that the federal regulations infringe on state discretion by establishing consumer protections. On a national level,
SWMIA prevents persons under twenty-one, persons on the self-exclusion list, and interested
coaches or players from placing sports wagers); S. 3793 §§ 101(a), (b) § 103(b)(4) (while states
could maintain their own consumer protections more narrowly tailored to their respective interests,
a uniform federal regulation efficiently establishes protections that most states would establish anyway).
204. W. VA. CODE § 29-22D-16(a) (2019); 4 PA.C.S. § 13C62(a) (2019).
205. Gregory, supra note 42, at 223–25; see Chuff, supra note 117, at 618–19 (regulations
must mitigate the “systemic risk and pervasive externalities to affect the surrounding community
and economy” while simultaneously realizing the benefits of “economic revitalization” and “entertainment.”).
206. Unlike PASPA, SWMIA does not violate the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering principle. In Hodel, Congress enacted a law regulating coal mining and giving the states the
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2. The Clearinghouse Vitally Facilitates Communication Between
the States, Federal Government, and the Leagues
To equip the states and leagues to protect the integrity of sports,
SWMIA establishes the Clearinghouse as a national entity to collect and organize sports data.207 The Clearinghouse operates a national repository of
data accessible by enforcement officers.208 This interstate repository is important because states do not have the resources to fight illegal gambling on
their own.209 The illegal market is widespread, and much illegal gambling is
housed overseas.210 States need a national entity to readily collect and distribute data.211 Without national collection, states would be forced to constantly communicate with one another about information that has been collected in different ways, or not collected at all.212 This state-by-state
approach is especially inefficient when Internet gambling occurs across state
and national lines. Most importantly, to prevent fraud by corrupt officials,
the sports leagues also need a national entity to collect and distribute data.
The sports leagues operate across state lines, and a national entity provides
a centralized information resource for the leagues. Without a centralized
resource, the leagues would be relying on individual states to collect and
distribute information. Even if the states decided to collect and offer data to
the leagues, the leagues would have to synthesize and make sense of accumulated data. A state-by-state method is therefore inefficient and risks that
some states will not participate. The Clearinghouse, on the other hand, is
efficient. It ensures that data and information will be captured and offered
choice to “either implement” the federal program “or else yield to a federally administered regulatory program.” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981).
Thus, the states were “not compelled to enforce the [federal] standards” or to “participate in the
federal regulatory program.” Id. at 288. The Court deemed this kind of law as “cooperative federalism” and held that it did not violate the anticommandeering principle because it did not compel
states to participate. Id. at 289; see Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479 (2018) (“[T]he federal
law allowed but did not require the States to implement a federal program.”) (emphasis in original).
207. S. 3793 § 106(a).
208. Id. § 106(c)(4).
209. Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 172.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 176.
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to the leagues on a national level, consistent with their national business
model.
England’s gambling laws provide an example of a successful national
information entity. In 2004, England proposed a Bill that reinvented the
country’s regulation of sports gambling.213 The Bill granted the Gambling
Commission power to facilitate information with local agencies.214 The
Commission’s power includes:
[I]nvestigatory powers previously unavailable to the Gaming
Board that include requiring local authority to produce
information, and enabling it to exchange information (including
criminal records) through ‘gateways’ with sporting and other
industry regulators and enforcement agencies.215
Like England’s Commission, the Clearinghouse can “exchange information” and require “local authority to produce information.”216 These powers over local authorities will enable the Clearinghouse to closely monitor
sports gambling fraud on a national level.217 The in-flow of local information
into a national collecting agency is crucial to efficiently monitor illegal practices.218 Like England’s Commission, the Clearinghouse will properly equip
the federal government, state governments, and the leagues to combat illegal
gambling. The Clearinghouse and the provision allowing states to license
local operators establishes a balanced federal-state approach that will contribute to SWMIA’s success. While the federal-state balance is appropriate,
SWMIA still must work hard to prevent insider fraud.
213. See generally Gambling Act 2005, c.19, § 326(1), (Eng.); Stephen Walsh & Juan
Lopez, Gambling on a New Commission, 154 NLJ 1850 (2004).
214. Walsh & Lopez, supra note 213.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Returning briefly to the securities analogy, Christopher Chuff has argued that a “single, unified administrative agency should govern all participants and transactions in the financial
markets.” Chuff, supra note 117, at 614 (citations omitted). Such a single agency would “enable
open communication between many financial regulators, increase efficiency of the administrative
agencies’ aggregate actions, and breed consistency and predictability into the legal framework.”
Id. at 614 (citations omitted). These same principles hold true for the Clearinghouse in the sports
gambling market.
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C. Successful Regulations Must Encourage and Require
Cooperation Between the Leagues and Enforcement Agencies
Finally, federal regulations should both encourage and require the
leagues to cooperate with enforcement agencies. To protect the integrity of
professional sports, the regulations must prevent fraudulent match fixing.
The best way to prevent fraudulent match fixing is to ensure that the leagues
will help combat the fraud. To ensure the leagues will help, the regulations
should both encourage and require the leagues to cooperate with enforcement
agencies. Otherwise, scandals like Donaghy’s will persist.

1. The Largest Threat to Sports Integrity Comes from the Inside
Federal regulations can help prevent fraud, but match-fixing could not
be stopped overnight since the government regulates sports gambling.219 The
“global nature” of match-fixing in soccer, for example, demonstrates that
match-fixing can “take place anywhere, regardless of whether gambling on
sports is legal or illegal in a particular place.”220 When considering the scope
of the regulations, Congress must recognize that match-fixing boils down to
corrupt insiders, specifically players or referees.221 The largest threat to the
integrity of sports comes from fraud generated by players or referees and
corrupt bookies.222 Within the last fifteen years, there have been three incidents which illustrate how this fraud occurs.
First, in Germany, Robert Hoyzer refereed games in the nation’s top
soccer league (“Bundesliga”).223 German enforcement agencies accused
Hoyzer of fraudulently fixing matches.224 After a four-week trial, the court
found Hoyzer guilty of fixing matches by awarding penalties to sides that he
bet on and sending off players for sides that he bet against.225 Hoyzer reportedly conspired with a sports-bar owner to fix the matches, and even received
219. Gregory, supra note 42, at 219.
220. Id.
221. E.g. Eden, supra note 1; e.g., Couzens, supra note 180; e.g., Harding, supra note 180.
222. E.g. Eden, supra note 1; e.g., Couzens, supra note 180; e.g., Harding, supra note 180.
223. Harding, supra note 180.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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solicitations from sports bettors during halftime of some matches.226 Less
than five years later, German police uncovered possible violations in three
Union of European Football Association (UEFA) Champions League
matches and twelve UEFA Europa League matches.227 The German police
noted that more than 200 games were under suspicion, but informed the public that this might be just the “tip of the iceberg.”228 The police believed that
more than one referee was involved, and catching all of the perpetrators was
crucial to maintaining integrity.229
Second, a scandal recently occurred in Spain’s top soccer league, La
Liga.230 On the last day of the season, fifth-placed Valencia faced Real Valladolid.231 Valencia needed a win to secure an automatic spot in next year’s
Champions League, a coveted position for clubs across Europe.232 A betting
agency reportedly paid Valladolid players to fix the match, and Valencia won
the game after Valladolid made two atrocious defensive mistakes.233 Spanish reports indicate that a criminal organizational leader named “Bravo” facilitated the fraud.234 While the suspected players have been arrested, the
investigation to uncover the extent of the scandal is ongoing.235

226. Id.
227. Owen Gibson, Europe Hit by ‘Biggest-Ever’ Match-Fixing Scandal, GUARDIAN (Nov.
20,
2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2009/nov/20/uefa-match-fixing-germany
[https://perma.cc/JHE8-2XF7].
228. Id.
229. Compared to the professional athletes or coaches, professional referees are especially
susceptible to betting syndicates because they often make significantly less money. See Jack Anderson, Sports: Murphy’s Law, 161 NAT’L L.J. 395 (2011) (“A common theme has been that individuals targeted by betting syndicates are often those who, relative to their counterparts, are modestly paid.”).
230. Couzens, supra note 180.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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Finally, the Donaghy scandal is a sobering example of insider fraud.236
Donaghy refereed NBA games from 1994 to 2007.237 According to his wife,
he was extremely secretive and spent most of his time playing golf and gambling.238 Sometime in the early 2000s, Donaghy allegedly began placing
wagers on games that he officiated.239 According to ESPN, but denied by
the NBA, Donaghy colluded with well-connected bookies to fix NBA games
by ensuring that the game stayed in the spread.240 ESPN writer Scott Eden
claims that Donaghy kept games in the spread by calling more fouls or letting
fouls slide depending on how the game developed.241 While the NBA claims
that Donaghy’s bets were isolated incidents, Eden claims that Donaghy
placed wagers on games that he officiated for many years.242 Like Robert
Hoyzer and the La Liga soccer players, Donaghy used his close position to
fraudulently affect the outcome of a game. Corrupt insiders with power to
alter the outcome of any given match are the primary source of sports gambling fraud, and the regulations must focus on these individuals.

2. The Regulations Must Encourage the Leagues to Cooperate, and
SWMIA’s Exclusive Data Provision Will Help Accomplish This
Goal
To prevent the fraud outlined above, the leagues must be fully committed to preventing fraud. The regulations, therefore, should encourage the
leagues to cooperate with enforcement agencies. To foster cooperation
through the regulations, Congress has various options. Paying the leagues a
flat integrity fee under the regulatory scheme is one way to get the leagues
236. Eden, supra note 1.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. In his article, Eden believes the evidence is clear that Donaghy placed wagers on
games that he personally refereed. Eden, supra note 1 (the NBA disputes that Donaghy placed bets
on games that he actually refereed); see Cassandra Negley, NBA Disputes Findings, Game Anecdotes and ‘Conflicting’ Quotes in ESPN’s Tim Donaghy Report, YAHOO! SPORTS (Feb. 22, 2019,
11:38 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/nba-disputes-findings-game-anecdotes-conflicting-quotesespns-tim-donaghy-report-193821436.html [https://perma.cc/3KNP-MAW7].
240. Eden, supra note 1; Negley, supra note 239.
241. Eden, supra note 1.
242. Eden, supra note 1; Negley, supra note 239.
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on board.243 Another method is to include a provision that pays the leagues
for use of their data and information.244 The NBA specifically believes it
should receive compensation for the use of its data.245 Commissioner Adam
Silver claims that without the NBA as an organization, the data would not be
available and sports gambling would not be possible.246 While existing law
does not create protectable interests in sports data, SWMIA effectively fashions an exception for the leagues.247 This exception is not perfect, but it
adequately fosters cooperation between the leagues and the government.
To foster cooperation, the regulations could pay the leagues for use of
their data, but existing law does not support any protectable interest in the
data. Courts have recognized unfair competition between businesses built
on disseminating facts, but the facts themselves are not protectable property.248 A foundational case addressing the protection of facts is Int’l News
Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (“INS”). Both the plaintiff and defendant
published news, but the defendant poached facts from plaintiff’s sources and
sold the facts as news to plaintiff’s competitors.249 The Court noted that the
commercial value of the news lay in the promptness and accuracy of the information.250 Under unfair competition laws, defendant could not rip off
plaintiff’s hard-earned efforts to gather and organize the facts.251 Otherwise,
243. See Adam Candee, NBA’s Adam Silver on Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June
1, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20904/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-talks-sportsbetting/ [https://perma.cc/E9MC-86UX] [hereinafter NBA’s Sports Betting].
244. See Matt Rybaltowski, Adam Silver Touts Virtues of NBA’s Intellectual Property In
Support Of 1% Gambling Integrity Fee, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2018, 9:47 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattrybaltowski/2018/02/18/adam-silver-touts-virtues-of-nbas-intellectual-property-in-support-of-1-gambling-integrity-fee/#18c45a5f2f19 [https://perma.cc/APJ8B33E].
245. NBA’s Sports Betting, supra note 243.
246. Id.
247. Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(5) (2018).
248. See Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); see also Nat’l Football
League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del. 1977); see also Nat’l Basketball
Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).
249. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 231.
250. Id. at 230.
251. Id. at 239.
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defendant could “reap where it has not sown.”252 The Court upheld the injunction against defendant for appropriating and disseminating plaintiff’s
news.253 But the Court limited its ruling to unfair competition between the
parties and declined to hold that the parties had public rights to the information.254 Furthermore, the Court expressly held that the facts themselves
were in the public domain and could not be protected by copyright.255
Subsequent courts limited the scope of unfair competition under INS
while emphasizing that facts and data could not be protected.256 The issue
arose in a sports and gambling context in the mid-1970s.257 Delaware
established a lottery system in which consumers placed small bets on the
outcome of NFL games.258 The lottery scoreboard did not use any team
names, but it referred to the teams by city, such as “Philadelphia” when
referring to the Philadelphia Eagles.259 The NFL sued the state of Delaware
for misappropriation and trademark infringement in Nat’l Football League
v. Governor of Del. (“Delaware”).260 In that case, the NFL argued that they
had invested immense time and effort in building the popularity of their
brand.261 According to the NFL, by profiting from information generated by
NFL games, Delaware “reap[ed] where it ha[d] not sown.”262

252. Id.
253. Id. at 246.
254. Id. at 236.
255. Id. at 234.
256. See Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del.
1977); see also Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997); see also
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
257. Nat’l Football League, 435 F. Supp. at 1375.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1380.
260. Id. at 1375–76.
261. Id. at 1377.
262. Id. (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918)).
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However, the court rejected the NFL’s argument.263 It found that the
NFL did not have a protectable interest in the “end result” of its hard labor,
regardless of how much “public interest” the information generated.264 Further, the NFL disseminated the information into the public domain, and it did
not have a protectable interest in public information.265 The judge compared
lotteries that profit from sports data to businesses that profit from sports
games by selling food or souvenirs to game attendants on their way to the
stadium.266 According to the court, businesses that profit from sports games
in this way are “collateral service[s]” to the game itself.267 Like the adjacent
businesses that profit from game attendants, gambling operators may profit
from public sports information.268 Therefore, the NFL had no protectable
stake in public game data and they could not collect any profits from gambling operators who used the information.269
In a similar vein, the Second Circuit declined to extend copyright
protection to athletic competitions and the data underlying the games.270 In
1996, Motorola manufactured the “SportsTrax” device.271 SportsTrax
supplied real-time information about NBA games, including the teams
playing, scores, time remaining, and possession.272 SportsTrax operated on
a “data feed” in which live watchers or listeners streamed the information as
they watched the game.273 The NBA claimed that this relay of information

263. Id. at 1377–78.
264. Id. at 1377.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1378.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See generally Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
271. Id. at 843.
272. Id. at 843–44.
273. Id. at 844.
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violated its copyright in the games.274 However, the court held that the sports
game itself is not sufficiently “authored” for copyright protection.275 The
court noted that a broadcast can be copyrighted when it is simultaneously
recorded by the NBA.276 However, the court specifically held that the data
from the broadcasts, including game scores and other statistics, could not be
protected by copyright.277 Because the facts are not protectable, private
entities like sports gambling operators may freely use the game data.278
The court also distinguished Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press from the
case because Motorola’s real-time transmission did not “free-ride” on the
NBA’s efforts.279 The court distinguished between appropriating information from the NBA’s source and using one’s own resources and efforts to
collect facts from the game.280 Because Motorola used its own efforts to
collect factual game information, and because there is no inherent property
right in that information, it did not unfairly compete under INS.281
INS, Delaware, and Motorola collectively illustrate that under current
law, the sports leagues are not legally entitled to compensation for use of
their data.282 The data from games are not protectable by copyright or trademark, no matter how much effort and money the leagues invest in each
game.283 Under these cases, sports gambling is a “collateral” business to the

274. Id. at 845.
275. Id. at 847.
276. Id.
277. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc.,
499 U.S. 340 (1991); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 847.
278. Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (D. Del. 1977)
(noting that gambling operators are free to use public sports information).
279. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 854 (citation omitted).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 223
(1918); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 847.
283. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234; Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105
F.3d at 847.
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sports games themselves.284 Therefore, while Congress could compensate
the leagues for use of their data, this method has no direct support from case
law.285 Unless federal regulations create an exception to the rules above, the
leagues are not entitled to compensation for the use of their data. Without
compensation, however, the leagues will lack incentive to cooperate with the
government’s cumbersome regulations. To solve this problem and foster
cooperation, SWMIA compensates the leagues by granting them exclusive
control over gambling data.286
Instead of compensating the leagues for their data or paying the leagues
a flat fee for maintaining integrity, SWMIA contains an exclusive data provision.287 The provision provides that until 2024, all licensed gambling operators may only use data provided by the relevant sports league or an entity
expressly authorized by that league.288 After 2024, the operators must use
data of the same quality approved by the applicable league.289 For example,
a sportsbook accepting wagers for a Sunday NFL football game may only
use data authorized by the NFL. In anticipation of this provision, the leagues
have already established business relationships with sports data processors.290 All four leagues process data using Sportradar, a leading sports data

284. Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977).
285. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 23; Nat’l Football League, 435 F. Supp. at 1377–78;
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 847.
286. Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(5) (2018).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. League Partnerships, SPORTRADAR, https://sportradar.us/about-us/league-partnerships/ [https://perma.cc/K736-JW8T] (outlining Sportradar’s relationship with the NFL, NBA,
MLB, and NHL).
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collector and processer.291 Sportradar uses an application programing interface (API) to collect and process sports data.292 Sportradar’s API and Managed Trading Services (MTS) can help users create custom sportsbook platforms, making an easy jump into the gambling market for the leagues.293 In
fact, the NBA has already incorporated Sportradar’s integrity processes and
policies, setting the stage for a smooth transition if and when SWMIA takes
effect.294 Big-business data operators like Sportradar are likely the type of
entities that will exclusively provide data to operators under SWMIA.295
SWMIA’s exclusive data provision vests immense power in the sports
leagues, but ultimately is an appropriate way to foster cooperation between
the leagues and the government. In sports gambling, control over data dictates the entire industry.296 Whoever controls the data effectively controls
sports gambling.297 Control over data distribution is essentially “the difference between having value and having no value at all.”298 Congress, therefore, has given the leagues an extremely valuable method of control over
sports gambling. Because the leagues have exclusive protection of the data
under SWMIA, the bill effectively carves out an exception to the Delaware

291. Id. (outlining Sportradar’s relationship with the NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL);
Rybaltowski, supra note 244.
292. Sports
Data,
[https://perma.cc/QX5K-X9B8].

SPORTRADAR,

https://sportradar.us/sports-data/

293. Sports
Betting,
SPORTRADAR,
https://sportradar.us/betting-services/
[https://perma.cc/FXZ9-KDQP] (“Whether you want to create a sophisticated sportsbook from
scratch, or expand and grow an existing one, Sportradar’s Managed Trading Services (MTS) is the
perfect partner.”).
294. Rybaltowski, supra note 244.
295. League Partnerships, supra note 290 (outlining Sportradar’s relationship with the
NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL).
296. See James Glanz & Agustin Armendariz, When Sports Betting is Legal, the Value of
Game Data Soars, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/sports/sportsbetting.html [https://perma.cc/T249-MQ7P].
297. Id.
298. Id.
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and Motorola rules.299 In the context of sports gambling, the leagues now
have a protectable interest in the facts derived from the applicable game.
Furthermore, while the exclusive data provision expires in 2024, this
limitation is less restrictive than it appears. As of the current SWMIA draft,
the data provision expires in 2024.300 Future drafts, however, could extend
the date or make it permanent.301 Indeed, under the first draft, the provision
expired in 2022 but has since been pushed back to 2024.302 Additionally,
after 2024, the data must be of the same quality as that approved by the
leagues.303 The leagues already use high-quality data provided by providers
like Sportradar.304 Under a narrow interpretation, “of the same quality” may
be limited to data from providers like Sportradar who are closely affiliated
with the leagues.305 A narrow interpretation would effectively keep the data
in the leagues’ control. Other criticisms of the data provision include market
barriers and other inefficiencies.306 For example, data from leading providers like Sportradar and Genius Sports is expensive.307 The going rate for a
data package covering 300 games can fall within $4,000 to $6,000 a
month.308 Small operators cannot afford these prices, and this provision will
299. See Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del.
1977); see also Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).
300. Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(5) (2018).
301. See John Brennan, Federal Sports Betting Bill Has ‘Integrity’ in the Title and Data in
the Details, SPORTS HANDLE (Dec. 19, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/federal-sports-betting-billintroduced/ [https://perma.cc/7H4G-HEW3] (pointing out that the timeline has already been extended from 2022 to 2024).
302. Id.
303. S. 3793 § 103(b)(5).
304. Sports Betting, supra note 293.
305. S. 3793 § 103(b)(5).
306. See Matt Rybaltowski, Here’s How Much ‘Official’ League Data Actually Costs,
SPORTS HANDLE (Mar. 12, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-official-data-cost/
[https://perma.cc/FLL2-YKUE] [hereinafter Official League Data Cost] (indicating that small operators cannot pay for big-company data and big company data may not be of much higher quality
anyway).
307. Id.
308. Id.
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create even higher barriers of entry to the gambling market.309 Some experts
also argue that as technology becomes generally available to smaller operators, there is no substantial difference in quality in data from league-authorized entities and non-authorized entities.310 Finally, SWMIA’s data provision may create virtual monopolies in large data companies that have close
connections to the powerful sports leagues.311
Although the data provision has troubling implications, it ultimately
will encourage the cooperation necessary to combat fraud. For the reasons
above, the exclusive data provision vests substantial power in the leagues
and it might hinder the growth of the gambling market. While this power
should not be granted lightly, the data provision is the kind of compensation
that will facilitate cooperation between the leagues and the government.
Without their slice of the pie, the leagues will have less incentive to comply
with cumbersome federal regulations. Thus, the data provision should give
the leagues incentive to cooperate. But merely encouraging cooperation may
not be enough to keep the leagues accountable. In addition to being encouraged to cooperate, the leagues should be required to cooperate with enforcement agencies.

3. The Regulations Must Require the Leagues to Cooperate, but
SWMIA Does Not Expressly Require the Leagues to Cooperate
While SWMIA’s data provision encourages the leagues to cooperate,
SWMIA troublingly leaves room for the leagues to cover up internal fraud.312
Under the Bill, gambling operators and state entities must explicitly cooperate with federal investigations.313 However, the Bill fails to require the sports

309. See Cabot & Miller, supra note 20, at 158–59 (discussing barriers to entry created by
regulatory compliance costs).
310. Official League Data Cost, supra note 306; see also Glanz & Armendariz, supra note
296 (arguing that Sportsradar’s affiliation with oft-indicted offshore operators presents yet another
integrity issue).
311. In the case of Sportradar, the integrity of the data provider also becomes an issue.
According to various reports, Sportradar has provided information to offshore operators that are
under federal investigation. See Glanz & Armendariz, supra note 296.
312. See Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 103(b)(15) (2018).
313. Id.
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leagues to cooperate with investigations.314 Donaghy’s referee scandal illustrates how and why the leagues may abuse this freedom to undermine the
investigation and enforcement of fraud.
Donaghy’s scandal suggests that the leagues may undercut enforcement agencies to preserve their brand. After the FBI received a tip that
Donaghy was fixing spreads, it conducted a tight-lipped investigation.315
The FBI held the investigation under wraps because it wanted to catch other
colluding referees.316 Despite this covert approach, the lead investigator sat
down to discuss the scandal with then-NBA Commissioner David Stern and
other NBA executives, including current commissioner Adam Silver.317
Stern was visibly upset, and he voiced complete cooperation with the FBI.318
Only a month after the meeting, however, the investigation leaked to the New
York Post, which naturally blew the entire issue open.319 The author of
ESPN’s article suggests, and the FBI’s lead investigator believes, that the
NBA leaked the story to avoid uncovering widespread game fixtures by other
referees.320 By allegedly leaking the story, the NBA purportedly cut off any
chance of exposing pervasive integrity violations within the league.321
Naturally, the NBA disputes the accuracy of ESPN’s article, including
the extent of Donaghy’s collusion.322 Regardless of whether the NBA leaked
the investigation, this scandal illustrates the potential conflict between
leagues and enforcement agencies. Professional sports leagues have powerful brands.323 Like all brands, their value is subject to public perception. The

314. See id.
315. Eden, supra note 1.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.; Gibson, supra note 227.
322. See Negley, supra note 239.
323. See Kenneth Cortsen, NBA, LeBron James and Global Branding of Basketball, SPORT
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES (July 6, 2017), http://kennethcortsen.com/nba-lebron-james-global-
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leagues will maintain the appearance of integrity at all costs, and they have
powerful resources to do so.324 If they are not required to cooperate with the
regulating or enforcement agencies, they can use their power to inhibit investigations that might devastate their business.325 Therefore, unless the regulations strictly regulate the leagues, internal violations will persist.
To solve this problem, the regulations should first facially require the
leagues to cooperate. Congress can find helpful language in the United
Kingdom Gambling Commission publications.326 The United Kingdom
passed comprehensive gambling regulations in 2005.327 The regulations
state that “[a] person commits an offence if without reasonable excuse he
obstructs, or fails to cooperate with, a constable, enforcement officer or authorized person who is exercising or seeking to exercise a power” under the
Act.328 Because sports gambling is widespread in the United Kingdom, lawmakers in the United States should openly derive from the language and approach of the United Kingdom Commission. At a bare minimum, federal
regulations must include similar language requiring the leagues to cooperate
with—and not obstruct—investigations.
Additionally, as a lead enforcement and information agency, the Clearinghouse should promulgate codes that clarify the role of league officials.

branding-basketball/ [https://perma.cc/67YU-AC8J] (“[T]he business model of the NBA and the
attached capitalization power have grown considerably over the years.”).
324. For example, at the time that Eden suggests the NBA leaked the Donaghy scandal,
former FBI agent Bernie Tolbert served as Senior Vice President of Security for the NBA. Eden,
supra note 1.
325. E.g., id.
326. See generally Gambling Act 2005, c.19, § 326(1), (Eng.).
327. Id.
328. Id. Under the United Kingdom’s standard scale, the maximum fine available for this
offense is £1,000. See Gambling Act 2005, c.19, § 326(2), (Eng.); see also Criminal Justice Act
1982, c.48, § 37(2), (Eng.).
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The United Kingdom’s Gambling Commission provides several provisions
with helpful language.329 For example, the United Kingdom’s Gambling
Commission requires licensees to:
[W]ork with the Commission in an open and cooperative way and
to disclose anything which the Commission would reasonably
need to be aware of in exercising its regulatory functions. This
includes, in particular, anything that is likely to have a material
impact on the licensee’s business or on the licensee’s ability to
conduct licensed activities compliantly. Licensees should have
this principle in mind in their approach to, and when considering
their compliance with, their obligations under the conditions
attached to their license.330
By including simple language like this, the Clearinghouse could actively remind and encourage league officials to cooperate with the regulations. Because the Clearinghouse will work closely with the leagues in the
course of exchanging data and information,331 the entities have an opportunity to build a strong relationship. If the relationship is strong and mutually
respectful, league officials are more likely to cooperate.
Facial requirements and good relationships, however, may not be
enough. Eden suggests that the NBA, who did not have a bad relationship
with the FBI and expressed total cooperation with the investigation, leaked
the scandal to prematurely end the investigation.332 The regulations must,
therefore, enforce criminal punishments against league officials who refuse
to cooperate or obstruct enforcement agencies.333 To enforce criminal punishments, the Clearinghouse should exercise strong oversight over the

329. Gambling Codes of Practice, U.K. GAMBLING COMMISSION (Apr. 2018),
https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/PDF/Gambling-codes-of-practice-Consolidated-for-allforms-of-gambling.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9SS-HFXE].
330. Id.
331. See Sports Wagering Market and Integrity Act, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 106(a) (2018).
332. Eden, supra note 1.
333. See Hazen, supra note 128, at 384 (“The criminal enforcement weapon is especially
applicable when we recognize that many market participants are gamblers and many of the securities fraudsters seem to engage in behavior quite similar to those who profit from illegal gambling
activities.”).
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leagues.334 Like the SEC, the Clearinghouse should perform routine checkups and streamline investigations of league officials.335 Because it facilitates
data and information between leagues and enforcement agencies, the Clearinghouse is already in prime position to strictly monitor the leagues during
investigations.336 With increased oversight and threat of stricter punishment,
the professional leagues will have more difficulty undermining investigations.
Congress must walk a fine line. The drafters must encourage cooperation without twisting the leagues’ arms. Forced cooperation may embitter
the leagues, making them more likely to undermine operations. Too little
encouragement, on the other hand, permits the leagues to protect their brand
at the expense of integrity. There is no easy answer, but successful regulations must at least facially require the leagues to cooperate. Successful regulations will also require strict compliance with enforcement agencies and
criminally punish obstructionists. Unless SWMIA is revised to require this
cooperation and enforce criminal punishments for violators, internal violations like Donaghy’s (and the other NBA referees who may have partook in
the scandal)337 will go unrevealed and unpunished.

IV. CONCLUSION
A new dawn is rising for sports gambling in the United States, and it
presents significant legal challenges. In Murphy, the Court tossed away wide
prohibition on sports gambling,338 and the federal government must decide
how to regulate this lucrative market.339 To prevent fraud, federal regulations must primarily emulate security regulations. Like security regulations,
the regulations cannot work properly unless they prevent fraud through criminal punishment and strict enforcement. Additionally, successful regulations
334. As explained above, the Clearinghouse under the current draft of SWMIA plays only
an informational role. See S. 3793 § 106(a). The Clearinghouse, however, should take on an enforcement and monitoring role, especially with the professional sport leagues.
335. See Chuff, supra note 117, at 624–25 (citations omitted) (discussing the SEC’s enforcement role).
336. See S. 3793 § 106(a).
337. See Eden, supra note 1.
338. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018).
339. See generally S. 3793.
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must strike a proper balance between state and federal control. The crucial
part of this balance is allowing the states to license operators while establishing a national entity to collect and distribute data. Finally, the regulations
must decide how to encourage cooperation between the government and the
professional sport leagues. While the leagues are not entitled to compensation for the use of game data,340 SWMIA encourages cooperation by granting
control of the data exclusively to the leagues.341 While the leagues may be
encouraged, they must also be required to cooperate. The Clearinghouse
must take an active oversight role and enforce criminal punishments against
the leagues for failure to cooperate. There is no clear play in this area, but
successful regulations must cover these fundamental requirements.

340. Int’l News Serv. v Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); Nat’l Football League v.
Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377–78 (D. Del. 1977); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola,
Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).
341. See S. 3793 § 103(b)(5).

